The DeepSeek API uses an API for­mat com­pat­i­ble with OpenAI/Anthropic. By mod­i­fy­ing the con­fig­u­ra­tion, you can use the OpenAI/Anthropic SDK or soft­wares com­pat­i­ble with the OpenAI/Anthropic API to ac­cess the DeepSeek API.

* The model names deepseek-chat and deepseek-rea­soner will be dep­re­cated on 2026/07/24. For com­pat­i­bil­ity, they cor­re­spond to the non-think­ing mode and think­ing mode of deepseek-v4-flash, re­spec­tively.

Invoke The Chat API​

Once you have ob­tained an API key, you can ac­cess the DeepSeek model us­ing the fol­low­ing ex­am­ple scripts in the OpenAI API for­mat. This is a non-stream ex­am­ple, you can set the stream pa­ra­me­ter to true to get stream re­sponse.

For ex­am­ples us­ing the Anthropic API for­mat, please re­fer to Anthropic API.

curl

python

nodejs

curl https://​api.deepseek.com/​chat/​com­ple­tions \ -H “Content-Type: ap­pli­ca­tion/​json” \ -H “Authorization: Bearer ${DEEPSEEK_API_KEY}” \ -d ‘{ “model”: “deepseek-v4-pro”, “messages”: [ {“role”: “system”, “content”: “You are a help­ful as­sis­tant.“}, {“role”: “user”, “content”: “Hello!“} ], “thinking”: {“type”: “enabled”}, “reasoning_effort”: “high”, “stream”: false }’

It took just a few months of President Donald Trump’s sec­ond term for Palantir em­ploy­ees to ques­tion their com­pa­ny’s com­mit­ments to civil lib­er­ties. Last fall, Palantir seemed to be­come the tech­no­log­i­cal back­bone of Trump’s im­mi­gra­tion en­force­ment ma­chin­ery, pro­vid­ing soft­ware iden­ti­fy­ing, track­ing, and help­ing de­port im­mi­grants on be­half of the Department of Homeland Security, when cur­rent and for­mer em­ploy­ees started ring­ing the alarm.

Around that time, two for­mer em­ploy­ees re­con­nected by phone. Right as they picked up the call, one of them asked, “Are you track­ing Palantir’s de­scent into fas­cism?”

“That was their greet­ing,” the other for­mer em­ployee says. “There’s this feel­ing not of ‘Oh, this is un­pop­u­lar and hard,’ but ‘This feels wrong.’”

Palantir was founded—with ini­tial ven­ture cap­i­tal in­vest­ment from the CIA—at a mo­ment of na­tional con­sen­sus fol­low­ing the September 11, 2001, at­tacks, when many saw fight­ing ter­ror­ism abroad as the most crit­i­cal mis­sion fac­ing the US. The com­pany, which was co­founded by tech bil­lion­aire Peter Thiel, sells soft­ware that acts as a high-pow­ered data ag­gre­ga­tion and analy­sis tool pow­er­ing every­thing from pri­vate busi­nesses to the US mil­i­tary’s tar­get­ing sys­tems.

For the past 20 years, em­ploy­ees could ac­cept the in­tense ex­ter­nal crit­i­cism and awk­ward con­ver­sa­tions with fam­ily and friends about work­ing for a com­pany named af­ter J. R. R. Tolkien’s cor­rupt­ing all-see­ing orb. But a year into Trump’s sec­ond term, as Palantir deep­ens its re­la­tion­ship with an ad­min­is­tra­tion that many work­ers fear is wreak­ing havoc at home, em­ploy­ees are fi­nally rais­ing these con­cerns in­ter­nally, as the US’s war on im­mi­grants, war in Iran, and even com­pany-re­leased man­i­festos has forced them to re­think the role they play in it all.

“We hire the best and bright­est tal­ent to help de­fend America and its al­lies and to build and de­ploy our soft­ware to help gov­ern­ments and busi­nesses around the world. Palantir is no mono­lith of be­lief, nor should we be,” a Palantir spokesper­son said in a state­ment. “We all pride our­selves on a cul­ture of fierce in­ter­nal di­a­logue and even dis­agree­ment over the com­plex ar­eas we work on. That has been true from our found­ing and re­mains true to­day.”

“The broad story of Palantir as told to it­self and to em­ploy­ees was that com­ing out of 9/11 we knew that there was go­ing to be this big push for safety, and we were wor­ried that that safety might in­fringe on civil lib­er­ties,” one for­mer em­ployee tells WIRED. “And now the threat’s com­ing from within. I think there’s a bit of an iden­tity cri­sis and a bit of a chal­lenge. We were sup­posed to be the ones who were pre­vent­ing a lot of these abuses. Now we’re not pre­vent­ing them. We seem to be en­abling them.”

Palantir has al­ways had a se­cre­tive rep­u­ta­tion, for­bid­ding em­ploy­ees from speak­ing to the press and re­quir­ing alumni to sign non-dis­par­age­ment agree­ments. But through­out the com­pa­ny’s his­tory, man­age­ment has al­ways at least ap­peared to be open to en­gage­ment and in­ter­nal crit­i­cism, mul­ti­ple em­ploy­ees say. Over the last year, how­ever, much of that feed­back has been met by philo­soph­i­cal so­lil­o­quies and redi­rec­tion. “It’s never been re­ally that peo­ple are afraid of speak­ing up against Karp. It’s more a ques­tion of what it would do, if any­thing,” one cur­rent em­ployee tells WIRED.

While in­ter­nal ten­sions within Palantir have grown over the last year, they reached a boil­ing point in January af­ter the vi­o­lent killing of Alex Pretti, a nurse who was shot and killed by fed­eral agents dur­ing protests against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in Minneapolis. Employees from across the com­pany com­mented in a Slack thread ded­i­cated to the news de­mand­ing more in­for­ma­tion about the com­pa­ny’s re­la­tion­ship with ICE from man­age­ment and CEO Alex Karp.

“Our in­volve­ment with ice has been in­ter­nally swept un­der the rug un­der Trump2 too much,” one per­son wrote in a Slack mes­sage WIRED re­ported at the time. “We need an un­der­stand­ing of our in­volve­ment here.”

Around this time, Palantir started wip­ing Slack con­ver­sa­tions af­ter seven days in at least one chan­nel where most of the in­ter­nal de­bate takes place, #palantir-in-the-news. Because the de­ci­sion was­n’t for­mally an­nounced be­fore the pol­icy rolled out, one worker who no­ticed the dele­tions asked in the chan­nel why the com­pany was re­mov­ing “relevant in­ter­nal dis­course on cur­rent events.”

A mem­ber of Palantir’s cy­ber­se­cu­rity team re­sponded, writ­ing that the de­ci­sion was made in re­sponse to leaks.

This pe­riod led Palantir man­age­ment to re­lease an up­dated wiki, or a col­lec­tion of blog posts ex­plain­ing the ICE con­tract, where the com­pany de­fended its work with Homeland Security. Management wrote that the tech­nol­ogy the com­pany pro­vides “is mak­ing a dif­fer­ence in mit­i­gat­ing risks while en­abling tar­geted out­comes.”

Palantir man­age­ment ran de­fense by hold­ing a hand­ful of AMA (ask me any­thing) fo­rums across the com­pany with lead­er­ship like chief tech­nol­ogy of­fi­cer Shyam Sankar and mem­bers of its pri­vacy and civil lib­er­ties (PCL) teams.

At least one of these AMAs was or­ga­nized in­de­pen­dently of PCL lead­er­ship by two team leads, in­clud­ing one who worked di­rectly on the ICE con­tract for a pe­riod of time. “This was very rogue,” a PCL em­ployee who worked on the ICE con­tract said in a February AMA, a record­ing of which was ob­tained by WIRED. “Courtney [Bowman, head of the pri­vacy and civil lib­er­ties team] does­n’t know that I’m spend­ing three hours this week talk­ing to IMPLs [Palantir ter­mi­nol­ogy for its client-fac­ing prod­uct teams], but I think this is the only real way to start go­ing in the right di­rec­tion.”

Throughout the lengthy call, em­ploy­ees work­ing on a va­ri­ety of Palantir’s de­fense pro­jects posed hard ques­tions. Could ICE agents delete au­dit logs in Palantir’s soft­ware? Could agents cre­ate harm­ful work­flows on their own with­out the com­pa­ny’s help? What is the most ma­li­cious thing that could come out of this work?

Answering these ques­tions, the PCL em­ployee who worked on the ICE con­tract said that “a suf­fi­ciently ma­li­cious cus­tomer is, like, ba­si­cally im­pos­si­ble to pre­vent at the mo­ment” and could only be con­trolled through “auditing to prove what hap­pened” and le­gal ac­tion af­ter the fact if the cus­tomer breached the com­pa­ny’s con­tract.

At one point dur­ing the call, one of the em­ploy­ees tried to level with the group, ex­plain­ing that Palantir’s work with ICE was a pri­or­ity for Karp and some­thing that likely would­n’t change any time soon.

“Karp re­ally wants to do this and con­tin­u­ously wants this,” they said. “We’re largely at the role of try­ing to give him sug­ges­tions and try­ing to redi­rect him, but it was largely un­suc­cess­ful and we seem to be on a very sharp path of con­tin­u­ing to ex­pand this work­flow.”

Around the time of these fo­rums, Karp sat down for a pre­re­corded in­ter­view with Bowman, seem­ingly to dis­cuss Palantir’s con­tracts with ICE, but re­fused to broach the topic di­rectly. Instead, Karp sug­gested that em­ploy­ees in­ter­ested in the work sign nondis­clo­sure agree­ments be­fore re­ceiv­ing more de­tailed in­for­ma­tion.

Then came the deadly February 28 mis­sile strike on an Iranian el­e­men­tary school on the first full day of the Trump ad­min­is­tra­tion and Israel’s war in Iran. The US is the only known coun­try in the con­flict to use that spe­cific type of mis­sile. More than 120 chil­dren were killed when a Tomahawk mis­sile struck the school, kick­ing off a se­ries of in­ves­ti­ga­tions that con­cluded that the US was re­spon­si­ble and that sur­veil­lance tools like Palantir’s Maven sys­tem had been used dur­ing that day’s strikes. For a com­pany full of em­ploy­ees al­ready reel­ing over its work with ICE, pos­si­ble in­volve­ment in the death of chil­dren was a break­ing point.

“I guess the root of what I’m ask­ing is … were we in­volved, and are do­ing any­thing to stop a re­peat if we were,” one em­ployee asked in the Palantir news Slack chan­nel. Some em­ploy­ees posed sim­i­lar ques­tions in the thread, while oth­ers crit­i­cized them for dis­cussing what could be con­sid­ered clas­si­fied in­for­ma­tion in a Slack chan­nel open to the en­tire com­pany. The in­ves­ti­ga­tion is on­go­ing.

The Palantir spokesper­son said the com­pany was “proud” to sup­port the US mil­i­tary “across Democratic and Republican ad­min­is­tra­tions.”

In March, Karp gave an in­ter­view to CNBC claim­ing that AI could un­der­mine the power of “humanities-trained—largely Democratic—voters” and in­crease the power of work­ing-class male vot­ers. While crit­ics re­acted to the piece, call­ing the state­ments con­cern­ing, so did em­ploy­ees in­ter­nally: “Is it true that AI dis­rup­tion is go­ing to dis­pro­por­tion­ately neg­a­tively af­fect women and peo­ple who vote Democrat? and if it is, why are we cool with that?” one worker asked on Slack in a chan­nel ded­i­cated to news about Palantir.

Palantir’s lead­er­ship in­censed work­ers yet again this week af­ter the com­pany posted a Saturday af­ter­noon man­i­festo re­duc­ing Karp’s re­cent book, The Technological Republic, to 22 points. The post—which in­cludes many of Karp’s long-stand­ing be­liefs on how Silicon Valley could bet­ter serve US na­tional in­ter­ests—goes as far as sug­gest­ing that the US should con­sider re­in­stat­ing the draft. Critics called the man­i­festo fas­cist.

Internally, the post alarmed some work­ers who hud­dled in a Slack thread on Monday morn­ing, ques­tion­ing lead­er­ship over its de­ci­sion to post it in the first place.

“I’m cu­ri­ous why this had to be posted. Especially on the com­pany ac­count. On the prac­ti­cal level every time stuff like that gets posted it gets harder for us to sell the soft­ware out­side of the US (for sure in the cur­rent po­lit­i­cal cli­mate), and I doubt we need this in the US?” wrote one frus­trated em­ployee. The mes­sage re­ceived more than 50 “+1” emo­jis.

“Wether [sic] we ac­knowl­edge it or not, this im­pacts us all per­son­ally,” an­other worker wrote on Monday. “I’ve al­ready had mul­ti­ple friends reach out and ask what the hell did we post.” This mes­sage re­ceived nearly two dozen “+1” emoji re­ac­tions.

“Yeah it turns out that short-form sum­maries of the book’s long-form ideas are easy to mis­rep­re­sent. It’s like we taped a ‘kick me’ sign on our own backs,” a third worker wrote. “I hope no one who de­cided to put this out is sur­prised that we are, in fact, get­ting kicked.”

These con­ver­sa­tions in­volv­ing shame and un­cer­tainty from work­ers have seem­ingly popped up in in­ter­nal chan­nels when­ever Palantir has been in the news over the last year. “I think the only thing not dif­fer­ent is a lot of folks are still in­cred­i­bly wary about leaks and talk­ing to the press,” one cur­rent em­ployee tells WIRED, de­scrib­ing how the in­ter­nal com­pany cul­ture has evolved over the last year.

All of this dis­sent does­n’t seem to bother Karp, who re­cently told work­ers that the com­pany is “behind the curve in­ter­nally” when it comes to pop­u­lar­ity. Here, he’s been con­sis­tent; in March 2024 Karp told a CNBC re­porter that “if you have a po­si­tion that does not cost you ever to lose an em­ployee, it’s not a po­si­tion.”

But for em­ploy­ees, the cul­ture shift feels in­ten­tional. “I don’t want to as­sert that I have knowl­edge of what’s go­ing on in their in­ter­nal mind,” one for­mer worker tells WIRED. “But maybe it’s got­ten to a place where en­cour­ag­ing in­de­pen­dent thought and ques­tion­ing leads to some bad con­clu­sions.”

Over the past month, we’ve been look­ing into re­ports that Claude’s re­sponses have wors­ened for some users. We’ve traced these re­ports to three sep­a­rate changes that af­fected Claude Code, the Claude Agent SDK, and Claude Cowork. The API was not im­pacted.

All three is­sues have now been re­solved as of April 20 (v2.1.116).

In this post, we ex­plain what we found, what we fixed, and what we’ll do dif­fer­ently to en­sure sim­i­lar is­sues are much less likely to hap­pen again.

We take re­ports about degra­da­tion very se­ri­ously. We never in­ten­tion­ally de­grade our mod­els, and we were able to im­me­di­ately con­firm that our API and in­fer­ence layer were un­af­fected.

After in­ves­ti­ga­tion, we iden­ti­fied three dif­fer­ent is­sues:

On March 4, we changed Claude Code’s de­fault rea­son­ing ef­fort from high to medium to re­duce the very long la­tency—enough to make the UI ap­pear frozen—some users were see­ing in high mode. This was the wrong trade­off. We re­verted this change on April 7 af­ter users told us they’d pre­fer to de­fault to higher in­tel­li­gence and opt into lower ef­fort for sim­ple tasks. This im­pacted Sonnet 4.6 and Opus 4.6.

On March 26, we shipped a change to clear Claude’s older think­ing from ses­sions that had been idle for over an hour, to re­duce la­tency when users re­sumed those ses­sions. A bug caused this to keep hap­pen­ing every turn for the rest of the ses­sion in­stead of just once, which made Claude seem for­get­ful and repet­i­tive. We fixed it on April 10. This af­fected Sonnet 4.6 and Opus 4.6.

On April 16, we added a sys­tem prompt in­struc­tion to re­duce ver­bosity. In com­bi­na­tion with other prompt changes, it hurt cod­ing qual­ity and was re­verted on April 20. This im­pacted Sonnet 4.6, Opus 4.6, and Opus 4.7.

Because each change af­fected a dif­fer­ent slice of traf­fic on a dif­fer­ent sched­ule, the ag­gre­gate ef­fect looked like broad, in­con­sis­tent degra­da­tion. While we be­gan in­ves­ti­gat­ing re­ports in early March, they were chal­leng­ing to dis­tin­guish from nor­mal vari­a­tion in user feed­back at first, and nei­ther our in­ter­nal us­age nor evals ini­tially re­pro­duced the is­sues iden­ti­fied.

This is­n’t the ex­pe­ri­ence users should ex­pect from Claude Code. As of April 23, we’re re­set­ting us­age lim­its for all sub­scribers.

A change to Claude Code’s de­fault rea­son­ing ef­fort

When we re­leased Opus 4.6 in Claude Code in February, we set the de­fault rea­son­ing ef­fort to high.

Soon af­ter, we re­ceived user feed­back that Claude Opus 4.6 in high ef­fort mode would oc­ca­sion­ally think for too long, caus­ing the UI to ap­pear frozen and lead­ing to dis­pro­por­tion­ate la­tency and to­ken us­age for those users.

In gen­eral, the longer the model thinks, the bet­ter the out­put. Effort lev­els are how Claude Code lets users set that trade­off—more think­ing ver­sus lower la­tency and fewer us­age limit hits. As we cal­i­brate ef­fort lev­els for our mod­els, we take this trade­off into ac­count in or­der to pick points along the test-time-com­pute curve that give peo­ple the best range of op­tions. In the prod­uct layer, we then choose which point along this curve we set as our de­fault, and that is the value we send to the Messages API as the ef­fort pa­ra­me­ter; we then make the other op­tions avail­able via /effort.

In our in­ter­nal evals and test­ing, medium ef­fort achieved slightly lower in­tel­li­gence with sig­nif­i­cantly less la­tency for the ma­jor­ity of tasks. It also did­n’t suf­fer from the same is­sues with oc­ca­sional very long tail la­ten­cies for think­ing, and it helped max­i­mize users’ us­age lim­its. As a re­sult, we rolled out a change mak­ing medium the de­fault ef­fort, and ex­plained the ra­tio­nale via in-prod­uct di­a­log.

Soon af­ter rolling out, users be­gan re­port­ing that Claude Code felt less in­tel­li­gent. We shipped a num­ber of de­sign it­er­a­tions to make the cur­rent ef­fort set­ting clearer in or­der to alert peo­ple they could change the de­fault (notices on startup, an in­line ef­fort se­lec­tor, and bring­ing back ul­tra­think), but most users re­tained the medium ef­fort de­fault.

After hear­ing feed­back from more cus­tomers, we re­versed this de­ci­sion on April 7. All users now de­fault to xhigh ef­fort for Opus 4.7, and high ef­fort for all other mod­els.

A caching op­ti­miza­tion that dropped prior rea­son­ing

When Claude rea­sons through a task, that rea­son­ing is nor­mally kept in the con­ver­sa­tion his­tory so that on every sub­se­quent turn, Claude can see why it made the ed­its and tool calls it did.

On March 26, we shipped what was meant to be an ef­fi­ciency im­prove­ment to this fea­ture. We use prompt caching to make back-to-back API calls cheaper and faster for users. Claude writes the in­put to­kens to the cache when it makes an API re­quest, then af­ter a pe­riod of in­ac­tiv­ity the prompt is evicted from cache, mak­ing room for other prompts. Cache uti­liza­tion is some­thing we man­age care­fully (more on our ap­proach).

The de­sign should have been sim­ple: if a ses­sion has been idle for more than an hour, we could re­duce users’ cost of re­sum­ing that ses­sion by clear­ing old think­ing sec­tions. Since the re­quest would be a cache miss any­way, we could prune un­nec­es­sary mes­sages from the re­quest to re­duce the num­ber of un­cached to­kens sent to the API. We’d then re­sume send­ing full rea­son­ing his­tory. To do this we used the clear_­think­ing_20251015 API header along with keep:1.

The im­ple­men­ta­tion had a bug. Instead of clear­ing think­ing his­tory once, it cleared it on every turn for the rest of the ses­sion. After a ses­sion crossed the idle thresh­old once, each re­quest for the rest of that process told the API to keep only the most re­cent block of rea­son­ing and dis­card every­thing be­fore it. This com­pounded: if you sent a fol­low-up mes­sage while Claude was in the mid­dle of a tool use, that started a new turn un­der the bro­ken flag, so even the rea­son­ing from the cur­rent turn was dropped. Claude would con­tinue ex­e­cut­ing, but in­creas­ingly with­out mem­ory of why it had cho­sen to do what it was do­ing. This sur­faced as the for­get­ful­ness, rep­e­ti­tion, and odd tool choices peo­ple re­ported.

Because this would con­tin­u­ously drop think­ing blocks from sub­se­quent re­quests, those re­quests also re­sulted in cache misses. We be­lieve this is what drove the sep­a­rate re­ports of us­age lim­its drain­ing faster than ex­pected.

Two un­re­lated ex­per­i­ments made it chal­leng­ing for us to re­pro­duce the is­sue at first: an in­ter­nal-only server-side ex­per­i­ment re­lated to mes­sage queu­ing; and an or­thog­o­nal change in how we dis­play think­ing sup­pressed this bug in most CLI ses­sions, so we did­n’t catch it even when test­ing ex­ter­nal builds.

This bug was at the in­ter­sec­tion of Claude Code’s con­text man­age­ment, the Anthropic API, and ex­tended think­ing. The changes it in­tro­duced made it past mul­ti­ple hu­man and au­to­mated code re­views, as well as unit tests, end-to-end tests, au­to­mated ver­i­fi­ca­tion, and dog­food­ing. Combined with this only hap­pen­ing in a cor­ner case (stale ses­sions) and the dif­fi­culty of re­pro­duc­ing the is­sue, it took us over a week to dis­cover and con­firm the root cause.

As part of the in­ves­ti­ga­tion, we back-tested Code Review against the of­fend­ing pull re­quests us­ing Opus 4.7. When pro­vided the code repos­i­to­ries nec­es­sary to gather com­plete con­text, Opus 4.7 found the bug, while Opus 4.6 did­n’t. To pre­vent this from hap­pen­ing again, we are now land­ing sup­port for ad­di­tional repos­i­to­ries as con­text for code re­views.

We fixed this bug on April 10 in v2.1.101.

A sys­tem prompt change to re­duce ver­bosity

Our lat­est model, Claude Opus 4.7, has a no­table be­hav­ioral quirk rel­a­tive to its pre­de­ces­sor: as we wrote about at launch, it tends to be quite ver­bose. This makes it smarter on hard prob­lems, but it also pro­duces more out­put to­kens.

A few weeks be­fore we re­leased Opus 4.7, we started tun­ing Claude Code in prepa­ra­tion. Each model be­haves slightly dif­fer­ently, and we spend time be­fore each re­lease op­ti­miz­ing the har­ness and prod­uct for it.

We have a num­ber of tools to re­duce ver­bosity: model train­ing, prompt­ing, and im­prov­ing think­ing UX in the prod­uct. Ultimately we used all of these, but one ad­di­tion to the sys­tem prompt caused an out­sized ef­fect on in­tel­li­gence in Claude Code:

“Length lim­its: keep text be­tween tool calls to ≤25 words. Keep fi­nal re­sponses to ≤100 words un­less the task re­quires more de­tail.”

After mul­ti­ple weeks of in­ter­nal test­ing and no re­gres­sions in the set of eval­u­a­tions we ran, we felt con­fi­dent about the change and shipped it along­side Opus 4.7 on April 16.

As part of this in­ves­ti­ga­tion, we ran more ab­la­tions (removing lines from the sys­tem prompt to un­der­stand the im­pact of each line) us­ing a broader set of eval­u­a­tions. One of these eval­u­a­tions showed a 3% drop for both Opus 4.6 and 4.7. We im­me­di­ately re­verted the prompt as part of the April 20 re­lease.

Going for­ward

We are go­ing to do sev­eral things dif­fer­ently to avoid these is­sues: we’ll en­sure that a larger share of in­ter­nal staff use the ex­act pub­lic build of Claude Code (as op­posed to the ver­sion we use to test new fea­tures); and we’ll make im­prove­ments to our Code Review tool that we use in­ter­nally, and ship this im­proved ver­sion to cus­tomers.

We’re also adding tighter con­trols on sys­tem prompt changes. We will run a broad suite of per-model evals for every sys­tem prompt change to Claude Code, con­tin­u­ing ab­la­tions to un­der­stand the im­pact of each line, and we have built new tool­ing to make prompt changes eas­ier to re­view and au­dit. We’ve ad­di­tion­ally added guid­ance to our CLAUDE.md to en­sure model-spe­cific changes are gated to the spe­cific model they’re tar­get­ing. For any change that could trade off against in­tel­li­gence, we’ll add soak pe­ri­ods, a broader eval suite, and grad­ual roll­outs so we catch is­sues ear­lier.

We re­cently cre­ated @ClaudeDevs on X to give us the room to ex­plain prod­uct de­ci­sions and the rea­son­ing be­hind them in depth. We’ll share the same up­dates in cen­tral­ized threads on GitHub.

Finally, we’d like to thank our users: the peo­ple who used the /feedback com­mand to share their is­sues with us (or who posted spe­cific, re­pro­ducible ex­am­ples on­line) are the ones who ul­ti­mately al­lowed us to iden­tify and fix these prob­lems. Today we are re­set­ting us­age lim­its for all sub­scribers.

We’re im­mensely grate­ful for your feed­back and for your pa­tience.

In Brief

Posted:

11:08 AM PDT · April 23, 2026

Meta is plan­ning to cut 10% of its work­force, amount­ing to 8,000 em­ploy­ees, ac­cord­ing to a re­port from Bloomberg. Meta also will not hire for 6,000 roles that are cur­rently open.

According to an in­ter­nal memo sent to em­ploy­ees Thursday and viewed by Bloomberg, Meta told staff that the cuts will be­gin on May 20. Reuters had ear­lier re­ported on Meta’s plans for sweep­ing lay­offs.

TechCrunch has reached out to Meta for com­ment.

“We’re do­ing this as part of our con­tin­ued ef­fort to run the com­pany more ef­fi­ciently and to al­low us to off­set the other in­vest­ments we’re mak­ing,” chief peo­ple of­fice Janelle Gale told em­ploy­ees, ac­cord­ing to the memo. “This is not an easy trade­off and it will mean let­ting go of peo­ple who have made mean­ing­ful con­tri­bu­tions to Meta dur­ing their time here.”

Meta spent tens of bil­lions on its meta­verse ef­forts, which largely failed. The com­pany has also had to make ma­jor in­vest­ments in its AI ef­forts in or­der to keep up with com­peti­tors in the space — ear­lier this month, it de­buted a com­pletely over­hauled AI prod­uct called Muse Spark.

Topics

Subscribe for the in­dus­try’s biggest tech news

Latest in Social

Please make sure your browser sup­ports JavaScript and cook­ies and that you are not block­ing them from load­ing. For more in­for­ma­tion you can re­view our Terms of Service and Cookie Policy.

A US spe­cial forces sol­dier in­volved in the cap­ture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was ar­rested and charged for al­legedly bet­ting on that op­er­a­tion, net­ting him $400,000 in prof­its.

According to an in­dict­ment un­sealed Thursday, Master Sgt. Gannon Ken Van Dyke opened an ac­count in late December on Polymarket, one of the best-known pre­dic­tion mar­kets. He wa­gered about $32,000 that Maduro would be “out” by January. The bet was a long-shot.

But Van Dyke was in­volved in the plan­ning and ex­e­cu­tion of Operation Absolute Resolve, pros­e­cu­tors al­lege, and had ac­cess to clas­si­fied in­for­ma­tion be­fore he placed the bet. His win­nings, though anony­mous, caught the at­ten­tion of law en­force­ment al­most im­me­di­ately.

Van Dyke, an ac­tive duty sol­dier sta­tioned at Fort Bragg, faces five crim­i­nal charges for steal­ing and mis­us­ing con­fi­den­tial gov­ern­ment in­for­ma­tion, theft and fraud. He will make his first court ap­pear­ance in North Carolina. No at­tor­ney has been listed for him on the court docket.

He al­legedly made 13 bets from December 27 to January 2, the last be­ing hours be­fore the overnight cap­ture. Prosecutors said Van Dyke sent his more than $400,000 in prof­its to a for­eign cryp­tocur­rency vault be­fore he de­posited them in an on­line bro­ker­age ac­count.

A mas­ter sergeant in the Army is a se­nior non­com­mis­sioned of­fi­cer, con­sid­ered a key tac­ti­cal leader and tech­ni­cal ex­pert and serv­ing as the prin­ci­pal NCO typ­i­cally at the Army bat­tal­ion level. Senior NCOs are of­ten looked to for set­ting and up­hold­ing the stan­dard for more ju­nior sol­diers in the unit.

Video Ad Feedback

US spe­cial forces sol­dier ar­rested af­ter al­legedly win­ning $400,000 on Maduro raid

0:40

• Source:

CNN

US spe­cial forces sol­dier ar­rested af­ter al­legedly win­ning $400,000 on Maduro raid

0:40

“Those en­trusted to safe­guard our na­tion’s se­crets have a duty to pro­tect them and our armed ser­vice mem­bers, and not to use that in­for­ma­tion for per­sonal fi­nan­cial gain,” said Jay Clayton, US at­tor­ney for the Southern District of New York.

Van Dyke was pho­tographed just af­ter the op­er­a­tion — and from when he placed his fi­nal bet — on “what ap­pears to be the deck of a ship at sea, at sun­rise wear­ing U.S. mil­i­tary fa­tigues, and car­ry­ing a ri­fle, stand­ing along­side three other in­di­vid­u­als wear­ing U.S. mil­i­tary fa­tigues,” court doc­u­ments say.

Van Dyke prof­ited more than $400,000, pros­e­cu­tors say. He then al­legedly moved those win­nings to a for­eign cryp­tocur­rency vault be­fore he de­posited them in an on­line bro­ker­age ac­count in what pros­e­cu­tors called an at­tempt to con­ceal their ori­gin.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed a re­lated com­plaint against Van Dyke on Thursday, seek­ing resti­tu­tion, dis­gorge­ment and civil mon­e­tary penal­ties.

CNN re­ported last month that fed­eral pros­e­cu­tors were in­ves­ti­gat­ing the Maduro trade, ac­cord­ing to a per­son fa­mil­iar with the mat­ter. The chiefs of the se­cu­ri­ties and com­mod­ity fraud unit at the US at­tor­ney’s of­fice in Manhattan met with rep­re­sen­ta­tives at Polymarket last month.

After the bets were placed, the US mil­i­tary launched a covert op­er­a­tion that ex­tra­dited Maduro from the pres­i­den­tial palace in Caracas in an overnight cap­ture while com­ing un­der heavy fire. Maduro was trans­ported to New York to face fed­eral drug-traf­fick­ing re­lated charges. He has pleaded not guilty.

Polymarket in a post on X said, “When we iden­ti­fied a user trad­ing on clas­si­fied gov­ern­ment in­for­ma­tion, we re­ferred the mat­ter to the DOJ & co­op­er­ated with their in­ves­ti­ga­tion. Insider trad­ing has no place on Polymarket. Today’s ar­rest is proof the sys­tem works.”

ABC News first re­ported Thursday’s ar­rest.

Trading on pre­dic­tion mar­kets has ex­ploded the past year, with users now spend­ing a few bil­lion dol­lars each week on such sites.

Lawmakers in Congress have in­tro­duced more than a dozen new bills this year to fur­ther reg­u­late pre­dic­tion mar­kets. Some of the bills, which gained bi­par­ti­san sup­port, would stiffen penal­ties against gov­ern­ment of­fi­cials who en­gage in in­sider trad­ing.

Trump told re­porters Thursday he is con­cerned about the grow­ing trend of bet­ting on geopo­lit­i­cal events. Asked about the charges against the US sol­dier, the pres­i­dent said he was not fa­mil­iar with the specifics of the in­ci­dent but com­pared it to base­bal­l’s all-time hit leader Pete Rose.

“That’s like Pete Rose bet­ting on his own team,” Trump said, re­fer­ring to the late base­ball player who was banned from base­ball for gam­bling.

Pressed on whether he is con­cerned about bet­ting tied to the war with Iran, Trump said it’s a global is­sue.

“Well I think that the whole world, un­for­tu­nately, has be­come some­what of a casino,” Trump said, adding that such bet­ting is hap­pen­ing “all over the world, and every place they’re do­ing these bet­ting things.”

“Now, I think that I’m not happy with it,” he con­cluded.

The Trump ad­min­is­tra­tion ap­proved Polymarket last year to start of­fer­ing trades for American cus­tomers, but its US-facing site is­n’t fully op­er­a­tional yet. The Maduro-related trades oc­curred on Polymarket’s highly pop­u­lar in­ter­na­tional site.

That site op­er­ates out of the reach of US reg­u­la­tions — which is how it’s able to of­fer mar­kets re­lated to war, which is il­le­gal un­der fed­eral law. But ex­perts say Americans can eas­ily ac­cess the off­shore site with a vir­tual pri­vate net­work, or VPN.

There is a de­bate in the pre­dic­tion mar­ket in­dus­try over the role of in­sid­ers in pre­dic­tion mar­kets. Some ex­perts see these mar­kets as a ve­hi­cle for in­for­ma­tion to flow more freely from in­sid­ers to the gen­eral pub­lic.

Asked about in­sider trad­ing risks, Polymarket’s CEO told Axios in November it was “super cool” that his plat­form “creates this fi­nan­cial in­cen­tive for peo­ple to go and di­vulge the in­for­ma­tion to the mar­ket,” in­clud­ing in­sid­ers.

Polymarket rolled out new rules in March, to “clarify three core cat­e­gories of pro­hib­ited in­sider trad­ing con­duct.”

They banned trades based on in­for­ma­tion that users were legally re­quired to keep con­fi­den­tial, and trades based on tips from some­one with the same oblig­a­tion. They also said peo­ple in “a po­si­tion of au­thor­ity or in­flu­ence” to af­fect the out­come of an event can­not par­tic­i­pate in any re­lated mar­kets.

This story has been up­dated with ad­di­tional de­tails.

CNN’s Marshall Cohen, Haley Britzky and Alejandria Jaramillo con­tributed to this re­port.

France Titres, the gov­ern­ment agency in France for is­su­ing and man­ag­ing ad­min­is­tra­tive doc­u­ments has dis­closed a data breach af­ter a threat ac­tor claimed the at­tack and steal­ing cit­i­zen data.

Also known as Agence na­tionale des titres sécurisés (ANTS), the ad­min­is­tra­tive body op­er­ates un­der the French Ministry of the Interior, serv­ing as the man­ag­ing au­thor­ity for of­fi­cial iden­tity and reg­is­tra­tion doc­u­ments in France. This in­cludes dri­ver’s li­censes, na­tional ID cards, pass­ports, and im­mi­gra­tion doc­u­ments.

According to an an­nounce­ment the agency pub­lished yes­ter­day, the at­tack oc­curred last week, and while the in­ves­ti­ga­tion is still on­go­ing, sev­eral data types for an undis­closed num­ber of in­di­vid­u­als may have been ex­posed.

“On Wednesday, April 15, 2026, the National Agency for Secure Documents (ANTS) de­tected a se­cu­rity in­ci­dent that may in­volve the dis­clo­sure of data from in­di­vid­ual and pro­fes­sional ac­counts on the ants.gouv.fr por­tal,” reads ANTS’s an­nounce­ment.

The types of data that may have been ex­posed are:

Login ID

Full name

Email ad­dress

Date of birth

Unique ac­count iden­ti­fier

Postal ad­dress (for some)

Place of birth (for some)

Phone num­ber (for some)

ANTS stated that it is cur­rently in the process of no­ti­fy­ing those iden­ti­fied as im­pacted.

The agency noted that the ex­posed in­for­ma­tion does not al­low unau­tho­rized ac­cess to its elec­tronic por­tals. However, the same data can be used in phish­ing and so­cial en­gi­neer­ing at­tacks.

“No ac­tion is re­quired from users. However, they are ad­vised to re­main highly vig­i­lant re­gard­ing any sus­pi­cious or un­usual mes­sages they may re­ceive (SMS, phone calls, emails, etc.) that ap­pear to come from ANTS,” the agency warned.

ANTS has no­ti­fied the data pro­tec­tion au­thor­ity (CNIL), the Paris Public Prosecutor, and has also in­volved the na­tional cy­ber­se­cu­rity agency (ANSSI) in the re­sponse ef­fort. The agency warned that the sale or dis­sem­i­na­tion of the data is il­le­gal.

19 mil­lion records claimed stolen

On April 16, a threat ac­tor us­ing the moniker ‘breach3d’ claimed the at­tack on hacker fo­rums claimed the at­tack on ANTS, al­leg­ing to be hold­ing up to 19 mil­lion records.

The threat ac­tor claims that the stolen data con­tains full names, con­tact de­tails, birth data, home ad­dresses, ac­count meta­data, and gen­der and civil sta­tus.

The data has been of­fered for sale for an undis­closed amount, so it has not been broadly leaked yet.

ANTS saus that user do not need to take any ac­tion but rec­om­mends ex­er­cis­ing “extreme cau­tion” about sus­pi­cious or un­usual com­mu­ni­ca­tion over SMS, voice, and emails ap­pear­ing to come from the agency.

BleepingComputer has con­tacted ANTS to ask about the threat ac­tor’s al­le­ga­tions, but we have not re­ceived a re­sponse as of pub­lish­ing.

Update 4/24 - ANTS pub­lished an up­date on the in­ci­dent where the agency con­firmed that 11.7 mil­lion ac­counts were im­pacted.

99% of What Mythos Found Is Still Unpatched.

AI chained four zero-days into one ex­ploit that by­passed both ren­derer and OS sand­boxes. A wave of new ex­ploits is com­ing.

At the Autonomous Validation Summit (May 12 & 14), see how au­tonomous, con­text-rich val­i­da­tion finds what’s ex­ploitable, proves con­trols hold, and closes the re­me­di­a­tion loop.

Claim Your Spot

Ubuntu 26.04 (“Resolute Raccoon”) LTS has been re­leased

on sched­ule.

This re­lease brings a sig­nif­i­cant up­lift in se­cu­rity, per­for­mance,

and us­abil­ity across desk­top, server, and cloud en­vi­ron­ments. Ubuntu

26.04 LTS in­tro­duces TPM-backed full-disk en­cryp­tion, ex­panded use of

mem­ory-safe com­po­nents, im­proved ap­pli­ca­tion per­mis­sion con­trols, and

Livepatch sup­port for Arm sys­tems, help­ing re­duce down­time and

strengthen sys­tem re­silience. […]

The newest Edubuntu, Kubuntu, Lubuntu, Ubuntu Budgie, Ubuntu Cinnamon,

Ubuntu Kylin, Ubuntu Studio, Ubuntu Unity, and Xubuntu are also be­ing

re­leased to­day. For more de­tails on these, read their in­di­vid­ual re­lease

notes un­der the Official fla­vors sec­tion:

https://​doc­u­men­ta­tion.ubuntu.com/​re­lease-notes/​26.04/#​of­fi­cial-fla­vors

Maintenance up­dates will be pro­vided for 5 years for Ubuntu Desktop, Ubuntu

Server, Ubuntu Cloud, Ubuntu WSL, and Ubuntu Core. All the re­main­ing fla­vors

will be sup­ported for 3 years.

This re­lease brings a sig­nif­i­cant up­lift in se­cu­rity, per­for­mance,

and us­abil­ity across desk­top, server, and cloud en­vi­ron­ments. Ubuntu

26.04 LTS in­tro­duces TPM-backed full-disk en­cryp­tion, ex­panded use of

mem­ory-safe com­po­nents, im­proved ap­pli­ca­tion per­mis­sion con­trols, and

Livepatch sup­port for Arm sys­tems, help­ing re­duce down­time and

strengthen sys­tem re­silience. […]

The newest Edubuntu, Kubuntu, Lubuntu, Ubuntu Budgie, Ubuntu Cinnamon,

Ubuntu Kylin, Ubuntu Studio, Ubuntu Unity, and Xubuntu are also be­ing

re­leased to­day. For more de­tails on these, read their in­di­vid­ual re­lease

notes un­der the Official fla­vors sec­tion:

https://​doc­u­men­ta­tion.ubuntu.com/​re­lease-notes/​26.04/#​of­fi­cial-fla­vors

Maintenance up­dates will be pro­vided for 5 years for Ubuntu Desktop, Ubuntu

Server, Ubuntu Cloud, Ubuntu WSL, and Ubuntu Core. All the re­main­ing fla­vors

will be sup­ported for 3 years.

See the re­lease

notes for a list of changes, sys­tem re­quire­ments, and more.